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Abstract 
The South Korea Sewol ferry accident in April 2014 claimed the lives of over 300 
passengers and led to criminal charges of 399 personnel concerned including imprisonment 
of 154 of them as of Oct 2014. Blame and punishment culture can be prevalent in a more 
hierarchical society like South Korea as shown in the aftermath of this disaster. This study 
aims to analyse the South Korea ferry accident using Rasmussen’s risk management 
framework and the associated AcciMap technique and to propose recommendations drawn 
from an AcciMap-based focus group with systems safety experts. The data for the accident 
analysis were collected mainly from an interim investigation report by the Board of Audit and 
Inspection of Korea and major South Korean and foreign newspapers. The analysis showed 
that the accident was attributed to many contributing factors arising from front-line operators, 
management, regulators and government. It also showed how the multiple factors including 
economic, social and political pressures and individual workload contributed to the accident 
and how they affected each other. This AcciMap was presented to 27 safety researchers 
and experts at ‘the legacy of Jens Rasmussen’ symposium adjunct to ODAM2014. Their 
recommendations were captured through a focus group. The four main recommendations 
include forgive (no blame and punishment on individuals), analyse (socio-technical system-
based), learn (from why things do not go wrong) and change (bottom-up safety culture and 
safety system management). The findings offer important insights into how this type of 
accident should be understood, analysed and the subsequent response. 
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1. Introduction 
On 15th April 2014, the South Korea Sewol ferry carrying 476 people which included 325 
high school students on a school trip, capsized and claimed the lives of over 300 passengers 
including the vast majority of students. In modern complex socio-technical systems like ships, 
which consist of complex and tightly coupled technostructures and their human operators, 
accidents are known to be caused by a variety of contributing factors including human, 
technical, organizational and social factors - not by just a single unusual decision or action of 
a specific actor (Shappell and Wiegmann, 2000; Heinrich et al., 1980; Reason 1995; Turner 
1978; Vincent and Christoffersen, 2006; Waterson, 2009b). 
On the contrary, accident investigation can be stuck on the old view, the Bad Apple Theory 
maintaining that safety problems are the result of a few bad apples (unreliable people) in an 
otherwise safe system (Dekker, 2014). This view focuses mainly on identifying human errors 
and violations, and blaming people concerned. Many Far East countries including South 
Korea have the culture that is characterised by ordering relationships by status and a strong 
sense of shame (Hofstede and Bond, 1988). In such culture that relies predominantly on 
hierarchical, compliance-based relationships, blame culture is more likely to occur (Khatri et 
al., 2009) as demonstrated in the aftermath of the South Korea ferry accident. More than a 
hundred people directly or indirectly related to this accident were legally put under arrest. 
Many high-rank officials including ministers of relevant governmental departments were 
dismissed or were under huge pressure to voluntarily resign their positions.  
Historically, South Korea has rapidly and successfully developed its economy after Korean 
War in 1950s through intense and increasing competition, but its safety record is poor 
compared with other advanced nations (OECD, 2007). For example, there were five big 
accidents which led to more than 100 deaths over the past 20 years including the Sewol 
ferry accident: Seo-hae Ferry accident in 1993 leading to 292 deaths; Dae-gu subway gas 
explosion in 1995 leading to 101 deaths; Sam-pung Department store collapse in 1995 
leading to 502 deaths and Dae-gu subway fire accident in 2003 leading to 192 deaths. After 
the accidents, people at the sharp end were usually held accountable and punished, but 
system level-lessons have hardly been learned. So, there is an urgent need for providing a 
framework for whole systems analysis for accident investigation.  
Previous evidence clearly suggests that accident investigation should not focus on human 
errors and violations that triggered the accident, but on the mechanisms generating the 
errors and violations in the actual, dynamic socio-technical context (Branford, 2011; 
Rasmussen, 1997; Rasmussen and Svedung, 2000; Vincent and Christoffersen, 2006). In 
the dynamic socio-technical systems, accidents are actually waiting for its release, because 
the stage for an accidental course of events has been prepared over time by the normal 
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efforts of working efficiently and cost-effectively by many actors in the daily work context. A 
quite normal variation in somebody’s behaviour can ultimately release an accident 
(Rasmussen, 1997). Accidents are just the end result of a number of causes, only the last of 
which are the unsafe acts of actors (Bird, 1974; Heinrich et al., 1980; Reason, 1990; 
Shappell and Wiegmann, 2000).  
Recently, several systems approaches, including the AcciMap approach, have been used for 
analysing accidents occurring in these complex socio-technical systems. These approaches 
capture and show varying contributing factors both from within different parts of the systems 
and interactions between them, and from external influences such as political, financial, and 
technological circumstances (Branford, 2011). Up to now, varying systems techniques have 
emerged including Swiss cheese model (Reason, 1990), Human Factors Analysis and 
Classification System (Shappell and Wiegmann, 2000), AcciMap (Rasmussen, 1997, 
Svedung and Rasmussen, 2002), FRAM (Hollnagel, 2004), STAMP (Leveson, 2004), etc. 
Of various systems techniques for investigating accidents, the AcciMap was employed in this 
study due to the following reasons. Firstly, the AcciMap approach enables us to represent 
the multiple contributing factors and their relationships onto the levels of the socio-technical 
system. The diagram also depicts the context within which an accident occurred and the 
interactions that resulted in the event (Branford, 2011). It contributes to the explicit 
introduction of a much higher number of potential dimensions than those restricted to 
technical and human error. Secondly, its utility and benefits have been proven through 
frequent application in a broad range of fields such as aviation and space vehicles (Branford, 
2011; Johnson and Muniz de Almeida, 2008), led outdoor activity (Salmon et al., 2010), 
public health sector (Vincente and Christoffersen, 2006; Woo and Vincente, 2003), road 
accidents (Svedung and Rasmussen, 2002), patient safety (Waterson, 2009a), and shooting 
accidents (Jenkins et al., 2010). Thirdly, it has provided theoretic basis of the work and 
thinking of many researches in the safety field (Amalberti 2001; Norman 1993; Reason 1990; 
Vincente and Christoffersen, 2006). Fourthly, it does not only explain why accidents 
occurred, but also reveals how they might be prevented by providing a useful platform for 
communication with the various disciplines (Rasmussen and Svedung 2000; Svedung and 
Rasmussen 2002; Vincente and Christoffersen, 2006; Jenkins et al., 2010). 
The objectives of this study were to analyse systematically the South Korea ferry accident 
using the AcciMap and to capture recommendations from a group of system safety experts 
with whom the AcciMap analysis results were shared. This study introduces a novel way of 
using the AcciMap not only as an analysis tool, but also as a representation for 
communicating complicated accident mechanisms and drawing recommendations from a 
group of safety experts. This study provides an important opportunity to advance the 
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understanding of a complex socio-technical failure in a more hierarchical culture. It also 
offers some important insights into how this type of accident should be analysed and 
responded in a country like South Korea. 
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2. Methods 
2.1 Accident analysis 
The data for the accident analysis were collected and validated from the following three 
sources: i) Interim post-accident report by the Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea (BAI); 
ii) news articles, columns and editorials in major South Korean and foreign daily newspapers, 
news magazines and broadcasting medias between April 2014 to October 2014 including 
Chosun-ilbo, Donga-ilbo, Yonhap News, Weekly/Monthly Chosun of Korea, the Financial 
Times of UK, and CNN of USA; iii) personal consultation with a senior operation manager in 
an international shipping company.  
The accident received very intense media coverage for several months so there was no 
shortage of articles. Relevant data were searched based on the keywords of ‘Sewol ferry 
cause’, ‘Sewol ferry preventive measure,’ which resulted in hundreds of articles. Of those, 
around a hundred articles that seemingly covered the accident’s causes and timeline, etc. 
were selected from reliable sources. After reading all the selected articles, 35 articles 
(included in Appendix) were finally chosen and used in the later analysis. Some facts and 
figures were validated through multiple sources. 
Two authors of this paper with human factors background and significant experience in the 
AcciMap method conducted an AcciMap analysis of the accident. This was internally 
validated by the remaining co-authors and externally validated by the senior operation 
manager in a shipping company. The AcciMap analysis involved the construction of a causal 
diagram, which maps the multiple contributing factors to the accident and their 
interrelationship on the five levels of the sociotechnical system. In this study, the structure of 
the AcciMap has been adopted from Svedung and Rasmussen (2002) and Branford (2011). 
Starting from outcomes of the accident at the bottom of the graph, five levels include 
physical/actor events, processes & conditions, technical & operation management, company 
management, regulatory bodies & association, and government & environment.  
 
2.2 Recommendations by safety experts 
With the aim of drawing recommendations from a group of system safety experts, a focus 
group was carried out. The AcciMap produced from the analysis was presented at ‘the 
legacy of Jens Rasmussen’ symposium, Adjunct Symposium of Organisation Design and 
Management (ODAM) conference 2014. The key aim of this symposium was to generate 
discussion and debate in the light of Rasmussen’s work about the new directions and the 
future of safety science. Twenty five to thirty safety experts from all over the world (UK, US, 
France, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Australia and Japan), both practitioners (risk and 
safety management consultancies and government agencies) and researchers (universities 
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and research institutes) attended this symposium. Most of them had experience working with 
or were influenced by Jens Rasmussen.  
The audience were given a form with open space prior to the presentation. They were asked 
to write down any recommendations to government, industry, regulators, and general public 
in South Korea while listening to the presentation. After a 20 min presentation explaining the 
accident background and contributing factors using the AcciMap, further 30-40 min group 
discussion was carried out around their suggestions and recommendations for safety 
improvement. Thirteen participants returned the completed written form with various 
recommendations and a thematic analysis on their comments was performed. The 
participants included nine senior academics, two researchers and two practitioners in the 
field of systems safety and risk management in various sectors (healthcare, nuclear, oil & 
gas, etc). 
3. Results 
3.1 Timeline 
On 15 April 2014, the Korean ferry of the Sewol left Incheon port for Jeju island. About 14 
hours after its departure, the ferry capsized in the sea 3.3km north Byungpoong island 
(narrow waterway called the Maenggol Strait) with treacherous currents. The detailed 
accident timeline appears in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Timeline of the Sewol ferry accident 
Time Event/Activity 
October 
2012 
Cheonghaejin Marine Company purchased an used ferry with age of 18 
years (called ‘Sewol’ later) from Japan.  
March 2013 Sewol’s expansion was approved by the Incheon Regional Maritime Affairs & 
Port Administration and Sewol began its operation. 
21:00 PM 
15 April 2014 
Sewol ferry left Incheon port for Jeju Island (150 minute delay from the 
scheduled time of departure due to foggy weather). 
08:48 AM 
16 April 2014 
The vessel began to list to port with booming sound and rapidly decelerated 
from 35km/h to 14km/h. 
08:52 AM 
16 April 2014 
A boy student on board contacted Chonnam Fire Service (119 emergency 
service) to report the accident using his mobile phone. 
08:55 AM 
16 April 2014 
The first navigating officer reported a distress situation to Jeju Vessel Traffic 
Service (VTS).  
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The second navigating officer made on-board announcements several times 
not to move from passengers’ location.  
08:56 AM 
16 April 2014 
Jeju VTS replied to the distress report and ferry’s crew asked for a rescue 
team.  
08:57 AM 
16 April 2014 
Jeju VTS disseminated the distress situation and requested the coast 
guard’s urgent rescue of the ferry. 
09:00 AM 
16 April 2014 
Jeju VTS told an unidentified crew member to get ready for abandoning the 
ship, but the crew member replied that the passengers cannot due to listing.  
09:04 AM 
16 April 2014 
A Sewol crew member reported the distress situation to Mokpo coast guard, 
but the coast guard did not take any action. 
09:05 AM 
16 April 2014 
A Sewol crew member asked Jeju VTS about the rescue activity and Jeju 
VTS replied to wait for it. Up to this time, a crew member repeatedly 
announced that passengers should stay put in the safe cabin. 
09:07~37 
AM 16 April 
2014 
Jindo VTS communicated with a crew member on the ongoing situation of 
the vessel. 
09:39 AM 
16 April 2014 
Eight engine crew members escaped from the vessel. 
09:46 AM 
16 April 2014 
Seven crew members including the captain and first engineer escaped from 
the vessel. 
10:25 AM 
16 April 2014 
The vessel listed by more than 90o to port. 
11:20 AM 
16 April 2014 
The vessel sank completely. 
11 Nov 2014 Search activity for the missing ended. 
 
3.2 AcciMap Analysis Results 
 The Sewol ferry accident resulted in loss of over 300 lives including nine missing, which was 
attributed to the combination of the capsizing accident of the ferry and shortcomings with the 
rescue operation after the incident. The poor rescue operation missed many opportunities to 
minimize human loss. The accident analysis is divided into two parts of the capsizing of the 
ferry and the rescue operation. They are represented separately in Figure 1 and Figure 2, 
and analysed in 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. 
3.2.1 Capsizing of the Ferry 
 
 Figure 1. AcciMap of the capsizing of the Sewol ferry 
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3.2.1.1 Physical processes & actor activities 
As the second bottom row of the AcciMap (Figure 1) indicates, three physical conditions, 
events and processes directly contributing to the capsizing were identified: poor restoring 
force (condition), shift of improperly secured cargos (event) and sudden turn of the ship 
(process). First, the restoring force is the ship’s capacity to return to a stabilised position 
after being destabilised. At the time of the capsizing accident, the Sewol’s restoring force 
was significantly reduced mainly due to three unsafe conditions: unjustifiable remodelling, 
deliberately over-drained ballast water (less than that required by the loading condition) and 
overloaded cargo. The operating company of Chonghaejin Marine Company purchased the 
ferry in 2012 from Japan. They remodelled it to raise passenger capacity by 116 (from 840 to 
956) and ended up with increased gross tonnage by 239t (from 6,586t to 6,825t). The 
company added extra passenger cabins and an art gallery on the third, fourth and fifth decks 
of the stern. This remodelling shifted the ferry’s centre of gravity upwards and to the stern 
and therefore the cargo weight limit was reduced by 1,360t (from 2,437t to 1,077t). Ignoring 
this new cargo weight limit, the ferry, when it capsized, was carrying almost twice its limit 
cargo weight as shown in Table 2. In order to compensate its cargo overload, a crew 
member had a practice of over-draining the ballast water carrying only about 43% of the 
standard quantity as specifically shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. Overloading and over-draining of the Sewol  
 Standard (limit/required) 
Conditions  
at the accident Changes made 
Cargo loaded 1,077t 2,142t + 1,065t overloading 
Ballast water 2,418t 1,042t -1,376t over-drained 
 
This unsafe operation was possible since marine operating inspectors examined the loading 
condition only by visually checking the load line on the hull of the ferry. The crew members 
noticed the ferry’s balance problem a few months before the accident and reported it, but 
company officials did not respond to it. Some dockworkers also said that the ferry was so 
unstable that it lurched badly during loading and unloading. In summary, the combination of 
the reduced ballast water and overloading of the cargo raised the ferry’s center of gravity 
upwards and made it more prone to tip due to its reduced restoring force.  
Second, the lashing devices that should have held cargo goods steady were found to be 
loose. The task of securing cargos was sub-contracted to an unlicensed company and some 
crew members did not even know how to use the lashing devices correctly. Stacks of cargo 
containers were in a condition that they could slide down to one side easily. It meant that 
they failed to implement the provision of the Sewol’s sailing control regulation, which was 
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written by the company and approved by the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries (MOF). It 
read that crew members should tightly secure cargo goods before departure using belts or 
iron chains with safety factor of over 4.0. 
Third, the sudden turn of the ferry made by an unexperienced navigating officer significantly 
contributed to the capsizing. The ferry’s departure was delayed by about 2.5 hours due to 
thick fog at the departing port (Incheon port). To catch up the delay, the captain selected the 
fast tide (about 0.39 m/s) but short seaway, called Maeggol Strait, instead of taking a routine 
route. The captain wanted to take a break and happened to leave an inexperienced third 
navigating officer to navigate the risky route on his own. The third navigating officer had 
been with the company only for six months at the time of accident. It was later revealed that 
he actually was banned from navigating a ship when entering and departing a port on 
account of his previous navigating mistake in December 2013. Furthermore, according to the 
daily log for repair, a problem with the steering gear had been reported 15 days before the 
accident, but was not addressed. After the accident, the third navigating officer 
acknowledged his mistake but pointed out that the steering turned so much faster than usual. 
In summary, three main factors that contributed to the sharp and sudden turn of the ferry 
were inexperience of the third navigating officer, poor functioning of the steering gear and 
fast tide.   
In turn, this made poorly secured cargoes and containers fall over and the ferry’s weight 
thrown to the left side, which resulted in the ferry listing to the left. The ferry’s listing was not 
restored to normal because of reduced restoring force due to the changes to the vessel 
design, overload and lack of ballast water. Consequently, the ferry listed more rapidly than 
usual, and completely sank in the sea in less than three hours, although a ship of that size 
should have taken several hours to sink. 
3.2.1.2 Technical & operational management 
The main contributing factors at this level include poor management of two groups of actors: 
the marine operation inspector and the crew members including the captain. According to 
the Enforcement Regulation of the Marine Transportation Act, marine operation inspectors 
are responsible for inspecting the number of people on-board, quantity of cargoes, status of 
secured cargoes and life-saving appliances before every departure. However, the inspection 
conducted by the marine inspector was superficial.  He only checked the load line on the hull 
from a distance and checked the remaining safety issues based on the written document 
self-reported by the captain. These inspection practices without any on-board examination 
gave plenty of room for safety violation in various aspects of the operation. 
Deficiencies in the crew members’ operations  management also had a significant impact on 
the capsizing. The captain ignored the Seafarers Act of Korea saying that the captain should 
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directly navigate ships when accessing a port or sailing a narrow waterway or when there is 
a possibility of risk on ships. Instead, the captain left the inexperienced third navigating 
officer alone at  the bridge when passing the dangerous seaway of Manggol strait.   
In addition, the captain failed to perform two important duties: inspecting on-board life-saving 
appliances such as life rafts; conducting safety education and emergency training for his 
crew members. These duties are prescribed in the Enforcement Regulations of the Marine 
Transportation Act and the Seafarers Act, respectively. 
3.2.1.3 Company management  
At this level, the capsizing was related to organizational influences such as Chonghaejin 
Marine Company’s culture: priority on short-term profit, employment of low-paid contract 
workers and prevalence of operational and safety oversights. The company had given 
priority to the pursuit of short-term profit for the owner’s family; it was revealed that there 
were illegal flows of money to the company owner’s family members. The following four 
examples illustrate the company’s culture.  
First, the company inappropriately and illegally modified the Sewol in 2012 to make more 
room for passengers. The company submitted falsified documentation to gain remodelling 
approval from the Incheon Regional Maritime Affairs & Port Administration (RMA&PA), which 
is a ship remodelling authorization governmental branch of the Ministry of Oceans and 
Fisheries (MOF). In the falsified document, the company raised Sewol’s average revenue 
per trip to get the authorization for the expansion. 
Second, since the company started to run the Incheon to Jeju route in March 2013, the ship 
routinely carried more cargo than allowed in 57% of its trips (139 out of 241 trips). The 
company was estimated to have earnt an extra profit of $2.9 million from overloading. Some 
dockworkers on Jeju port once held a demonstration in front of the local governmental office 
to complain that the ferry company was putting more cargo on the Sewol than it reported in 
cargo manifests. The complaint was made because the dockworkers, who were paid by the 
ton, were paid less due to the understated amount of cargo.  
Thirdly, in order to save operating costs, the employment of crew members was based on 
temporary contracts. Their contracts were usually renewed, but they had low salary and low 
job security compared to crew members in other marine companies in Korea. The Sewol’s 
senior crew members including the captain and officers were also temporary contract 
workers. The captain at the time of the accident was standing in for another fulltime captain 
who was on annual leave. 
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Fourthly, the company management did not respond to safety problems. Before the accident, 
crew members, including the full-time captain of the Sewol, reported problems with its 
restoring force and steering gear to the company management, but it was disregarded. 
Instead, the company executives requested crew members to load as much cargo as 
possible. 
3.2.1.4 Regulatory bodies & associations 
The contributing factors at this level included poor authorisation processes of the ferry’s 
expansion and lack of independence in inspection. Firstly, the Incheon Regional Maritime 
Affairs & Port Administration (RMA&PA) and the Korean Register of Shipping (KRS) wrongly 
approved the application of the Sewol’s remodelling submitted by the ferry’s operating 
company. The Incheon RMA&PA authorized the Sewol’s remodelling based on the falsified 
document without comparing it with the original document written by a Japanese Ship 
Inspection Institute before the ferry purchase.   
The KRS is a private organisation licensed by the government to carry out a task of certifying 
new design as seaworthy. The KRS licensed the remodelling under the condition that the 
company should set limits on the maximum amount of cargo and the minimum amount of 
ballast water when fully loaded. It assigned an inspector to ensure that the remodelling was 
done correctly. However, the inspector approved the remodelling without properly 
conducting an inclining test to determine whether the remodelled ship was sufficiently stable. 
The inclining test was conducted on the basis of the falsified documents submitted by a 
private design company. The design company reported an 100 ton-underestimate of the light 
weight of the ship (actual weight of the ship with no fuel, passengers, cargo, water and the 
like on board) and 436 ton-reduced cargo weight from 1,513t to 1,077t to meet the 
acceptance criteria of its remodelling. If the inclining test had been done on the basis of the 
correct data, the Sewol’s remodelling could have not been approved.  The company also 
submitted an impractical securing layout and the KRS negligently accepted it without a walk-
through examination.  
Secondly, there was a structural problem in the independence of the marine operation 
inspection. The Korea Shipping Association (KSA) is an industry group funded by the marine 
companies. Ironically, one of the KSA’s responsibilities was to monitor the operation safety 
of marine companies. Critics of the maritime safety system had said long before the accident 
that the KSA should not monitor safety because it has a built-in conflict of interest. It was 
reported that the KSA had proposed to the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries (MOF) that the 
marine operation inspection tasks should be transferred to the MOF several times, but the 
proposal was not accepted. 
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3.2.1.5 Government & environment 
The contributing factors at this level included failings of the MOF officials, loopholes in ship 
remodelling related laws and Korea’s social environment. There was wide-spread 
inappropriate patronage in high positions in the government-affiliated or supporting 
organisations. It was reported that former officials retired from the MOF took charge of head 
officials for 11 of 14 MOF-affiliated or supporting organisations including Korea Shipping 
Association, Regional Maritime Affairs & Port Administration and Korea Ship Safety 
Technology Authority as of May 2014. The MOF entrusted various safety-related tasks such 
as ship inspection, authorizing ship expansion, marine environment and port management 
and seafarer education to those affiliations, but the MOF did not tightly manage and oversee 
them due to the long standing relationships between officials. This might have influenced the 
action of wrongly licensing the Sewol’s remodelling and poorly checking its overload by the 
Korean Register of Shipping and the Korea Shipping Association.  
With regard to ship remodelling related law, there were no well-defined provisions that 
restrict a ship’s inappropriate remodelling, especially its height expansion. There is a 
provision in the Ships Safety Act that the MOF’s permission is required when expanding 
ships’ length, width and depth, while there is none for a ships’ height expansion. Due to this 
loophole, the Incheon RMSA&PA, the responsible organization for authorizing ship 
remodelling, made a mistake of approving the Sewol’s unreasonable expansion in height.  
The unique social environment of Korea was also thought to indirectly contribute to the 
accident. Among the ultimate factors contributing to the ferry accident, there might have 
been an economic model of neo-liberalism that prizes economic growth and profits above 
the welfare of citizens. It is often said in Korea that economic growth is everything and 
quality of life can be sacrificed. This might have brought about Korea’s intensely competitive 
society, quick-quick culture and culture of safety negligence. A further consequent of 
government pro-business policies was an increased prevalence of temporary contract-based 
low paid workers.  
3.2.2 Poor Rescue Operation 
The poor rescue operation after the capsizing is considered as another major factor for the 
loss of many lives. Figure 2 captured various contributing factors to the poor rescue 
operation. 
3.2.2.1 Physical processes & actor activities 
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The poor rescue operation was attributed to several unsafe conditions, events and 
processes: poor initial measures by crew members (process), confusing exit routes 
(condition), problems with on-board life rafts (condition), delayed report to authorities and 
arrival of rescuers (process) and poor initial rescue operation (process).  
Firstly, the poor initial measures by crew members wasted an opportunity to save more 
passengers after the capsizing. At the time of the accident, passengers were told to stay in 
the safe cabin as frequently as seven times between 8:55AM and 09:50AM while the ferry 
began its descent into the sea. Many passengers complied with the announcement without 
knowing that the ferry was sinking. In this situation, some students shouted, “This is fun!”, 
and joked about posting the event on Facebook. The captain asserted later that the decision 
not to evacuate passengers was based on the strong tidal current, cold water temperature 
and no arrival of rescue boats at that time. Between 09:39AM and 09:46AM, the captain and 
several crew members abandoned the ferry without helping passengers escape from the 
capsizing ferry. Fifteen crew members including the captain were among the first group of 
people saved. 
The crew members’ communication and coordination with other stakeholders were poor. At 
08:55AM, the first navigating officer reported a distress situation to Jeju Vessel Traffic 
Services (VTS) Centre. At 08:58AM, the captain ordered the second navigating officer to 
make an announcement that passengers should don the life vests and wait in the cabin. The 
second navigating officer tried to announce it, but failed to do so because he forgot to press 
an emergency button necessary for the announcement. At 09:00AM, a Jeju VTS official 
instructed the Sewol that you should prepare to abandon the ferry, but crew members did 
not respond to the instruction. At 9:25AM, another VTS official based in Jindo told the Sewol 
that you should let passengers put on life vests and prepare to evacuate them based on 
captain’s judgment. However, the captain did not make any decision and missed an 
opportunity to evacuate passengers. In the radio communication with the VTS, a crew 
member, without taking any action, just asked the VTS about whether or not the passengers 
could be rescued immediately in case of abandoning the ship. 
Secondly, narrow and confusing corridors made it more difficult for passengers to escape 
from the ferry by themselves. Due to several illegal design changes, the internal layout was 
different from that of the original drawing and became very complicated.  
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Figure 2. AcciMap of the poor rescue operation 
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Thirdly, the life rafts of the ferry were hardly used in the accident. The ferry was equipped 
with 44 life rafts, each having boarding capacity of 25. This capacity met the requirement 
and the inspection document said that all the life rafts passed periodical inspection tests. 
However, only one of the 44 life rafts was automatically released at the time of the accident.  
Fourthly, due to delayed accident reporting and subsequently delayed dispatching of rescue 
teams, the precious time for initial action was wasted. The first distress call came from a 
student on board who contacted the emergency service of a regional (Jeonnam province) 
Fire Service at 08:52 AM using his mobile phone. The dispatch of a fire helicopter 
emergency service was delayed because the fire service considered that marine accidents 
were outside their jurisdiction, but the jurisdiction of the KCG. At 08:55 AM (three minutes 
after the first distress call), a first navigating officer made a distress call to Jeju VTS, not to 
Jindo VTS which is near the accident site. This miscommunication contributed to delayed 
dispatch of rescue teams. 
Fifthly, poor initial rescue operation by on-site rescue teams led to far more sacrifice of 
passengers. The KCG rescue team which firstly arrived at the accident area could see the 
trapped passengers through the right side windows of the 60o-listed ferry. However, they 
could not rescue them in time because they did not have ropes and climbing equipment for 
the rescue. At the end, the rescue teams focused on rescuing a relatively small number of 
passengers visible and floating on the sea, who escaped the ferry themselves.  
3.2.2.2 Technical & operational management 
The contributing factors at this level include deficiencies in the actions of crew members and 
VTS operators, and poor control, coordination and communication between different 
organisations.  
Firstly, crew members’ actions significantly contributed to the poor initial rescue operation. 
Most crew members did not show expected seamanship in prioritizing passengers’ safety 
over their own lives. The Sewol’s captain as well as some crew members abandoned the 
ship before most passengers, while passengers were told to stay inside safe cabins. They 
violated the provision of the Seafarers Act that captains should not leave ships under their 
control from the time cargo starts to be loaded or passengers start to board to the time 
unloading of cargo and disembarking of passengers are completed. They also ignored an 
evacuation procedure of the Sewol’s sailing control regulation prescribing that the first and 
second navigating officers should help passengers escape a ship to its right and left, 
respectively, and that the helmsman and engineers should release the life rafts on both 
sides of a ship. Furthermore, the rescued crew members did not immediately let rescue 
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teams know their identities, let alone information on the situation of confined passengers in 
the ferry.   
The VTS’ failings contributed to the poor initial rescue operation. One of the most important 
roles of the VTS is to provide swift responses and communication for marine accidents and 
emergent situations. However, Jindo VTS was not competent in giving the Sewol’s crew 
members any concrete and prompt measures for the distress situation. For example, Jindo 
VTS understood the emergent situation in the ferry after 31 minute communication with its 
crew member (09:07AM~09:37AM). However, Jindo VTS repeatedly said to the crew 
member, “Properly handle all things related to rescuing based on the captain’s judgment” 
without giving any appropriate measure or order such as abandoning the ferry or assembling 
passengers on deck. In addition, the VTS did not notify the emergent situation to the on-site 
rescue teams and the rescue centre. 
Jindo VTS officials’ shortcomings in monitoring and control also prevented early detection of 
the Sewol’s abnormal symptom of listing. It was revealed that the controllers of Jindo VTS 
had been ignoring the service regulation that two controllers should be at work 
simultaneously; one has a duty to control the coastal sea and the other to control the offing 
sea. For more than one month before the accident, only one controller had been on duty and 
controlled both coastal and offing seas during night. It was estimated that the early detection 
could have made the rescue operation start five minute earlier which might had led to 
rescuing more passengers. 
Another problem in the rescue operations was the rescue centre’s failings in command and 
control. The rescue centre was a temporal organization with special purpose of commanding 
and coordinating rescue activities when major accidents occurred. Firstly, the rescue centre 
was under a hierarchical organisational structure (narrow region, wide region and national) 
and had consequently a long chain of command and control. The rescue activities were 
delayed partially because they had to spend too much time in reporting the accident to 
higher authorities and awaiting their orders. 
Secondly, the quality of command and control was also poor. The rescue centre ordered 
rescue teams to move to the accident area without giving important information such as the 
number of passengers, location of passengers, degree of the ferry’s sinking, means of 
transportation and ways of cooperation between rescue teams. This lack of information 
resulted in ineffective rescuing activities. 
 Even after the rescue centre became aware that most passengers had been waiting in the 
cabins, the centre did not instruct rescue teams to guide passengers to escape. Furthermore, 
in spite of the on-site rescue teams’ urgent report that the ship might sink soon, the regional 
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rescue centre ordered the rescue teams to put the passengers at ease so that they would 
not feel unrest, rather than to guide them to abandon the ship. 
3.2.2.3 Company management 
The main factors at this level were deficiencies in the company’s emergency training for their 
staff, both ferry crew and rescue team members. The ship operating company put profit 
above safety and minimised costs of safety training. In fact, the crew members had never 
received evacuation drills, and were inadequately prepared to deal with an emergency. It 
was also revealed that the financial pressure of the company was partially due to the fact 
that the company owner siphoned at least $33 million away from the company to his son’s 
company abroad. 
3.2.2.4 Regulatory bodies & associations 
The contributing factors at this level include inadequate management of inspection of the 
Sewol’s life raft by Korean Register of Shipping/Inspection Agency (KRS), lack of training by 
the Korea Coast Guard (KCG) and lack of experts in disaster management in Central 
Disaster and Safety Countermeasures Headquarter (CDSCH).  
At the first stage, a government-licensed private company inspected whether the ship’s life 
rafts operated normally. The company sampled just nine out of forty four life rafts and 
conducted rough-and-ready inspections within two days. It generally takes about 15 days to 
inspect all 44 life rafts. The final approval by the KRS was based on the company’s 
fabricated inspection report claiming that all of the 44 life rafts were in good order. At the 
accident, only one raft was released correctly. 
The KCG did not train its rescue workers for ship capsizing accidents. In addition, they did 
not have any rescue equipment for this capsizing situation. Some KCG rescue workers 
admitted in the court that they were not properly-acquainted with contents of the marine 
accident manual written by the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries.  
Lack of experts in disaster management in Central Disaster and Safety Countermeasures 
Headquarter (CDSCH) led to poor communication and coordination. The CDSCH is a 
temporary command and control centre for the management of disaster situations under the 
Ministry of Security and Public Administration (MSPA). The CDSCH officials were 
dispatched from relevant governmental organizations including the MOF, the MSPA, etc. 
However, there was no operating manual and they had not received any training for marine 
accidents, so they were not clear about their roles and confused with what to do. In addition, 
the CDSCH cited unchecked media reports and mistakenly announced that all the students 
on-board were rescued and that rescue teams had succeeded in entering the Sewol to save 
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passengers at the early stage of the disaster. This announcement later proved untrue and 
the government lost its trust from the public. 
3.2.2.5 Government & environment 
Absence of relevant recovery manuals for marine accidents and lack of overall coordination 
between government departments contributed to poor initial response. Korean government 
neglected to make and maintain manuals for marine accidents, and to train relevant 
personnel according to the manuals. Specifically, the MSPA did not provide an operating 
manual for the CDSCH.  
The CDSCH’s confusion with initial responses to the accident might have been attributed to 
its recent organisational restructuring several months before the disaster. The responsibility 
for man-made disaster management was transferred to the CDSCH from the National 
Emergency Management Agency in August 2013. The aim was to strengthen the 
commanding and adjusting functions for the disasters. However, by the time of the disaster, 
its structure and personnel needed to conduct the duties had not been fully transferred from 
relevant government ministries. At the beginning of the accident, the CDSCH’s focus was on 
media briefings, which were conducted six times at hourly interval, instead of much more 
important duties of commanding and adjusting the disaster countermeasures such as 
grasping the disaster status, searching for available rescue sources, administrative support, 
etc.  
Furthermore, two governmental agencies, the CDSCH and KCG, presented different figures 
on the same item or wrong information without mutual discussion and confirmation of facts. 
This confusion provoked anger and distrust of the general public. For example, while the 
KCG reported 477 passengers on board, 61 rescue ships and 8 helicopters dispatched on 
the site, the CDSCH reported 476 passengers on board, 34 rescue ships and 19 helicopters 
dispatched.  
3.3 Recommendations by safety experts 
Forty minute long discussion was carried out after the 20 min AcciMap presentation and 
written feedback was provided by 12 participants after the discussion. The comments were 
categorised into four topics: forgive; analyse; learn; change. First of all, almost half of the 
respondents (54%) emphasized the importance of forgiving people in such a systemic 
complex disaster and warned of the potential negative impact of simple blaming/punishing. 
One respondent very strongly stated that blaming/punishing people and improving safety are 
mutually exclusive options. Secondly, the importance of applying a socio-technical systems 
approach and human cognitive mental model-based approaches in accident investigation 
was mentioned by almost half of the respondents (46%). In addition, the importance of 
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independent and early investigation by experts was mentioned (23%). Thirdly, the potential 
benefit of the Safety II approach, learning from why things go right instead of why things 
went wrong, was mentioned (31%). Fourthly, both changes in top and middle level such as 
government policies, regulations (54%) and bottom-up cultural changes by frontline workers 
and general public (31%) were mentioned. The importance of development of appropriate 
safety/accident/disaster management system, e.g. training courses and materials and 
regular implementation of them, also featured (31%). 
Table 2. Recommendations by safety experts 
Categories 
(% of respondents) 
Respondents’ comments 
Forgive 
No blame / 
No punishment 
(54%) 
• Punishment should be avoided as much as possible. 
• Looking for and finding people to blame will not stop the next terrible accident 
from happening.  
• Striving towards a society that can account for and forgive human 
shortcomings should be the long term goal.  
• Emphasize that blame & punishment & removing people will not prevent a 
recurrence of the accident unless underlying causes are addressed. 
• Blame is a really short-term measure which does not solve the basic long-term 
problem  
• When error occurs, go for the problem, not the person. 
• You can choose only one option between punishing people and improving 
safety. You can’t have both. 
Analyse 
Systems perspective 
and system failure 
(46%) 
 
• Learn about the socio-technical system that leads to the accident 
(organisational, technical, environmental and personal factors)  
• It is evident that there is a complex network of factors that influence and drive 
an event, that exist independently of the individuals involved. 
• Avoid simplistic models to explain accidents such as “human error” and a 
systems perspective is needed, i.e. human, technology, organisation 
perspectives. 
• This is a classic system incident. 
• Investigators need to understand human cognitive mental models and 
decision making under degraded conditions. 
Analyse 
Investigation 
approach 
(23%) 
• Independent accident investigation by experts is important. 
• Conduct investigation interviews as early as possible to get the bottom of what 
happened. 
Learn 
Safety II approach 
(31%) 
• It may help to invert the inquiry into this accident. Instead of asking "why did 
this happen?" ask "why doesn't this happen often?" The usual findings are 
that there are many more opportunities to fail than there are actual failures. 
Why does the system work so well? What are people doing that usually 
prevents such accidents? 
• "The other story" about the resilience is the system that needs to be upheld 
and not eroded. What can we learn from what works and how can we 
strengthen that? 
• Look at positive factors affecting accident prevention/recovery during the 
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normal operation of the system 
• One way forward is to move focus from what went wrong and why, to what is 
supposed to work and how. That would be in line with the core ideas of high 
reliability organisations, e.g. organisational mindfulness. Recently, the same 
ideas have been re-labelled with "resilience engineering" as safety I and 
safety II and the likes. Such a shift of focus is one (of many) way to transit 
from retrospect to proactive future orientation that might aid learning (instead 
of blame) 
Change 
Focus on high or 
middle level recurrent 
causal/ 
contributing/control/re
strictive factors   
(54%) 
• Need to focus on underlying factors which influence likelihood of many error in 
different accidents 
• All accidents involve multiple causes. However many of these causes may be 
influenced by a small number of higher level of organisational causes.  
• If the higher level factors are not removed from this system, the same incident 
will continue to occur, even with the best, highly trained operators working at 
the lower levels. 
• What would be middle level causes and barriers (defences)? 
• Restrictions for safe behaviour should be identified and removed or 
minimised.  
• Fundamental change is needed to reduce risk within this system (starting with 
the higher level). Incremental changes will have little impact in the long term. 
• The most important is government policy. There should be government 
agency to do safety check regularly. Check points include physical equipment 
and manuals, training, etc. 
Change 
Culture change: 
bottom-up 
(31%) 
• Design or create a safety culture: an informed culture, a reporting culture; a 
learning culture; a just culture; a flexible culture. 
• Pressure for change should come from the front line and the public. Otherwise 
culture and structural changes won’t come.  
• The general public should ask for safety management certificate proof from 
the ferry company before boarding. 
• Perhaps a bottom-up approach of informing the sharp end in such systems – 
they want to operate safely, but don’t necessarily feel that they are allowed to 
or understand the potentials of their actions.  
Change 
Safety management 
system 
(31%) 
• Researchers should develop safety management course materials for ferry 
companies. 
• Business should do regular accident training courses. 
• Companies should provide manuals and training for staff 
• Practice rescue operations  
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4. Discussion 
The first objective of this study was to analyse systematically the South Korea ferry 
accident using Rasmussen’s risk management framework and the associated AcciMap 
technique. As demonstrated in other studies (Branford, 2011; Jenkins et al., 2010; 
Johnson and Muniz de Almeida, 2008; Salmon et al., 2010; Vincente and Christoffersen, 
2006; Waterson, 2009b; Woo and Vincente, 2003), this study provided additional 
evidence of the value of the AcciMap in analysing a large-scale accident investigation. 
4.1 Systemic Integration of Piecemeal Information  
This study confirmed that the AcciMap makes it possible to link many of the findings of 
the government report and numerous news articles in a comprehensive manner. As both 
Svenson et al. (1999) and Hopkins (2000) identified, this study also highlights how 
different interested parties and media articles tend to focus on the partial causal factors 
and biased recommendations that meet with their interest, expertise  or their 
understanding of the situation. Many news articles often addressed failings at only one or 
two levels in the Rasmussen's risk management framework. Furthermore, the disaster 
was heavily politicised later and some news articles only highlighted failings of 
government. The Board of Audit and Inspection report also focused mainly on the 
misconduct of government agencies. The AcciMap approach in this study provided the 
capacity to take the full picture into account and represent it.  
4.2 Balanced Representation of Human and Systems Factors 
This study also confirmed that the AcciMap demonstrated a balanced approach to the 
accident analysis focusing on the mechanisms generating failings in the complex 
sociotechnical systems, not on finding out who to blame. It showed that factors 
contributing to the accident include not only actors, conditions and events that ultimately 
released the accident, but also the combination of a number of interrelated systemic 
factors and influences (Turner 1978, Reason 1995). For example, a root cause of the 
'overdrained ballast water' was attributed to several factors in hierarchical order, such as 
the inadequate  safety operation check by a marine operating inspector, illegal 
remodelling of the Sewol by Chonghaejin Marine Company, wrong approval for the 
remodelling by the Incheon RMAS&PA and KRS, and lack of regulatory provision for the 
ship remodelling by the MOF. Another example is crew members' lack of seamanship. It 
might have come from lack of training, their unstable positions as contract workers and 
low salaries, which were mainly due to the company management policy of prioritizing 
profits over passengers' safety. The focus on short-term profit might have stemmed from 
the company's poor financial standing. The Incheon to Jeju ferry line was known to be 
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highly profitable, but since much money earned through ferry operating illegally flowed 
away into the company's owner and his family members, the company was in poor 
financial condition. As a result, the company had to reduce the budget for safety training 
for its crew members, and unreasonably expanded and dangerously overloaded the 
Sewol to maximise profit. The AcciMap helped see the operation of this company in the 
context of loosely regulated coastal liner business and “rule-bending” and “quick-quick” 
culture of South Korea society.  
It was found that the investigation of this accident in South Korea focused on blaming 
relevant actors' errors and violations. In the culture characterised by hierarchical, 
compliance-based relationships like South Korea (Hofstede and Bond, 1988), the 
common belief is that accountability systems are operationalised in terms of identification 
of culprits and corresponding threats of disciplinary or criminal proceedings. These 
beliefs rest on assumptions that remedial and disciplinary actions will produce 
improvements by increasing the motivation for safe practice (Woods, 2005). Any 
argument to move beyond a culture of blame can be suspected as a disguised attempt to 
protect culprits regardless of their positions in the system (operators, managers, 
regulators or government). The notion that erratic people degrade an otherwise safe 
system is widespread in this culture and calling to accountability becomes part of the 
process of identifying and protecting the system from unreliable people at various levels 
of the system. Once culprits are identified, it is common to invoke methods of remedial 
training, professional disciplinary action, limits on practice, or even criminal prosecution 
to improve safety. 
Blame in this accident had fallen mainly on crew, the ferry operating company, rescue 
teams and government officials. Their failings were viewed as root causes of the 
accident. As a result, the focus of the investigation by the prosecution and the Board of 
Audit and Inspection of Korea was on errors, violations and misconduct of people. For 
example, the prosecution arrested the captain of a KCG rescue ship dispatched to the 
accident site on charge of manslaughter in business for his poor rescue commanding. 
However, this simple punitive approach has been widely known to have limitations and 
negative implications, as highlighted in the recommendations by the safety experts of 
this study.  
Dekker (2012) pointed out the hindsight bias effect, a well known research finding 
relevant to accident analysis. It is common, after an event has occurred, to see the event 
as having been predictable. The bias lead us to oversimplify the complex situation 
confronting the people concerned and unfairly blame people.  
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The punitive approach provides only a partial/unbalanced view of the hazards and the 
factors that contribute to accidents (Cook et al., 1998; Vincent and Christoffersen 2006). 
The accidents cannot be attributed to an error or an one-time threat to safety, but to a 
combination of systematically-induced migration in work practices and an odd event that 
wound up revealing the degradation in safety that had been occurring all the time 
(Vincent and Christoffersen, 2006). Rasmussen (1997) asserted that if just the error or 
threat to safety had been avoided by some additional safety defences, the accident 
would still happen by another cause sometimes.  
To make matters worse, when adopting the punitive approach, accident investigations 
tend to end prematurely (Cook et al., 1998). The aim of the investigators becomes to find 
people responsible and punish them. The investigation ends prematurely when achieving 
that aim without investigating the variety of organisational and institutional factors that 
influence the decisions and actions at the sharp end. The risk of ending the investigation 
early is great. 
It is interesting to note that more than half of the safety experts emphasized the 
importance of forgiving people in this accident and warned the potential negative impact 
of a one-sided blaming culture, as shown in Table 2. It is understandable given the 
dominant blame culture prevalent in South Korea after the accident. However, the slogan 
of moving beyond a blame/punitive culture should not be a blind tolerance for an 
absence of accountability, but a call to abandon poor systems of accountability and to 
begin to design a more effective system of accountability (Woods, 2005). Previous 
research (Woods, 2005), however, demonstrated a dilemma in the system of 
accountability. Some factors in the reciprocating cycles of accountability may degrade 
decisions, performance, cooperation and learning, while other relationships in the cycle 
may enhance these cognitive processes. For example, calling for accountability can 
increase critical thinking and enhance the quality of action/decision in certain conditions, 
while it can increase defence behaviour and self-justification and reduce the quality of 
action/decision in other conditions. It is important to strike a balance between individual 
accountability and the systemic nature of the accident considering such reciprocating 
cycles of accountability.  
The Rasmussen's risk management framework and the AcciMap analysis in this study 
helped strike a balance by placing the events that finally released the accident into the 
necessary context for understanding how and why the accident occurred. The provision 
of this contextual detail can help avoid unfairly blaming people, because it provides the 
background of how their activities came about and how these actions were able to 
release an accident (Branford, 2011).  
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4.3 Dynamic Nature of Safety Migration and Countermeasures 
The findings in this study are in agreement with one of Rasmussen's (1997) predictions. 
Work practices in a complex socio-technical system are not static and they will migrate 
over time under the influence of a cost gradient and an effort gradient. The safety 
migration process usually happens when acute goals like cost and efficiency take 
precedence over chronic goals like safety as shown in this analysis. 
For example the captain worked under at least two competing goals working for 
maximum profit and a desire for minimum workload. The captain chose a short, but risky 
route to make up for a two hour delayed departure. At the same time the captain chose 
to take rest in order to work with minimum workload leaving only a six month 
experienced third navigating officer alone in the navigating bridge while sailing through 
the risky route. The captain, in the past, worked under these pressures all the time and 
managed many successful sails without any accident. He was considered a very 
competent and experienced captain because he worked for the maximum profit with 
minimum workload. Before the accident, the Chonghaejin Marine Company received 
several awards for logistics development. However, the captain did not know how close 
he was to the safety boundary and continued to work for even higher profit with even 
lesser workload. Eventually the captain ended up crossing the boundary and alignment 
with other weaknesses of the whole system led to the accident.   
On the other hand, the marine operation inspector was not under the influence of a cost 
gradient. He was inclined to work with minimum workload, but he did not need to work 
for the maximum profit since his employer, the KSA, is a non-commercial organisation. 
Instead, the inspector had conflict of interest and was under socio-political pressure from 
the KSA's members who are shipping operators. The widespread patronage between 
present and former government officials in government-affiliated organisations produced 
safety migration from the socio-political pressure in this accident.  
There were so many people involved in this particular accident including ferry crew 
members, staff and management of the Chonghaejin Marine Company, VTS operators, 
rescue team members, coast guard, and officials in the KRS, Incheon RMA&PA and 
government ministries. The migration of work practices occurred from the combination of 
economic, workload and socio-political pressures at multiple levels of a complex socio-
technical system, not just one level alone as predicted by Rasmussen (1997). 
Given the dynamic nature of safety migration, the target should be to help the whole 
system maintain high safety despite socio, political and economic pressures. This is the 
topic of resilience engineering, which was also suggested by some safety experts in this 
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study. The authors would like to further discuss the potential implication of this approach 
in the context of this accident.  
In order to counteract safety migration, the ferry transportation system of the future will 
need a means to recognise when the side effects of socio, political and economic 
pressures may be increasing safety risks. For example, resilience engineering would 
monitor evidence on whether effective safety approvals and checks are in place 
particularly when risky decisions are made. There is a need for a system to monitor its 
own practices and processes to detect when they are beginning to drift toward safety 
boundaries. However, when this pattern of drift toward failure is combined with multiple 
and fragmented stakeholders interacting together in the process, it is very challenging for 
anyone in the system to see the big picture and its own blind spots about risks. Even if 
there are monitoring roles in place, confirmation bias (one of the cognitive biases) may 
make people select for, interpret and focus on information that confirms their 
preconceptions. 
As demonstrated in this analysis, the evidence of risks, e.g. warning signs and signals 
prior to the accident, became invisible to people so that safety margins eroded over time.  
For example, the ferry's balance problem was noticed and reported by the crew 
members, but company officials did not respond to it. Some dockworkers complained 
about the illegitimate overloading of the cargo and even held a demonstration in front of 
local government, but the risk was neither detected nor responded to. The crew 
members also reported the steering gear problem, but the company management 
disregarded it. As mentioned earlier, it is difficult to judge in hindsight whether people 
were reckless, negligent or just working hard to deliver under pressure. 
In this messy context, the commitment to balance the acute pressures of efficiency and 
cost with the chronic pressures of safety by people at all levels (operators, managers 
and regulators) is first and foremost. Their willingness to invest resources in safety and 
to allocate them to safety management in a timely, proactive manner, despite pressures 
on efficiency and cost, are key factors in ensuring a safe system.  
The analysis also shows the importance of continuous monitoring and balancing the 
tradeoffs of various pressures and risk. In this sense, it is critical to have an independent 
and well-informed function with the role of monitoring the risk that the organisation is 
operating nearer to safety boundaries. In this accident, there were people with that role, 
e.g. regulators and inspectors, but they were neither independent, nor well-informed.  
4.4 Future Work 
One of the novelties of this study is in the way the AcciMap was used. This study used 
the AcciMap not only to analyse the accident, but also to communicate the accident with 
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the safety experts and to get their recommendations for safety improvement. Describing 
all of the factors and interrelationships in text would take multiple pages and be difficult 
to follow. Compiling the information graphically using the AcciMap makes the factors and 
interactions that resulted in the outcome clear and assists in conveying the information in 
a succinct way (Branford, 2011). However, many of the experts’ recommendations were 
abstract reflecting their general theoretical stance instead of being based on deep 
analysis of the accident. A further study with more focus on ease of understanding and 
usefulness of the AcciMap as a communication and group-based analysis tool is 
therefore suggested.  
There is another important issue for future research. The issue of power was not taken 
much into account in this analysis. The culture in South Korea has a relatively high 
degree of power distance (Hofstede, 1984), which often leads to mismatch of 
responsibility, accountability and authority. For example, one might have the 
responsibility for certain outcomes, but might not have sufficient authority (power) to 
influence or control the processes that lead to outcomes, which is called a “double bind” 
by Woods (2005). This double bind can be shaped implicitly by the conditions laid down 
at the top of organisations/society. The workers’ experience of being disregarded by 
position power serves as an example of how risk is socially constructed and how power 
influences the definition of risk and decisions/actions made by people at the lower end of 
power structure (Antonsen, 2009). Besides, accident analysis and post-accident justice 
can be influenced by people in power to protect existing structures and arrangements 
(Dekker, 2012). People without power, status and voice could be on the losing end of 
justice. This means that justice and power are closely overlapping categories as Dekker 
(2012) pointed out. This is an important issue for accident analysis in order to achieve 
new systems of accountability towards high openness to learning and high accountability 
particularly in countries with a high degree of power distance like South Korea.  
5. Conclusion 
This study aimed to analyse the South Korea ferry accident using Rasmussen’s risk 
management framework and the associated AcciMap technique and to propose 
recommendations drawn from an AcciMap-based focus group with systems safety 
experts. This study provided further evidence for of the value of Rasmussen’s risk 
management framework in a large-scale accident investigation: i) systemic integration of 
piecemeal information about the accident; ii) balanced representation of individual 
accountability and system factors; iii) dynamic nature of safety migration. This study 
demonstrated, for the first time, the utility, although limited, of AcciMap as a 
communication tool in drawing out recommendations from safety experts. Further studies 
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need to be carried out in order to further explore the potential of AcciMap as a 
communication and group-based analysis tool.  
The analysis highlighted the importance of having independent and well-informed people 
with the role of continuously monitoring risk in order to counteract safety migration. The 
results and methodological framework of this study would provide valuable insights to the 
Korean accident investigatory agencies such as Ministry of Public Safety and Security, 
Select Committee of the Sewol Accident and Korea Occupational Safety & Health 
Agency where the legacy of Jens Rasmussen’s work has yet to reach. 
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Appendix - A List of Newspaper Articles Used for the Accident Analysis 
1. Financial Times, Bad policy caused the ferry disaster, not bad culture, 2014.4.23. 
2. New York Times, In Ferry Deaths, a South Korean Tycoon’s Downfall, 2014.7.26. 
3. CNN, What went wrong on Sewol?, 2014.5.16. 
4. CNN, Angry families scream at South Korean ferry captain, crew as trial begins, 
2014.6.10. 
5. Yonhap News, 검찰 399명 입건…다시 돌아본 4월 16일 그 날, 2014.10.6. 
6. Donga-Ilbo, 선원들, 대피명령땐 승객보다 구조순위 밀릴까봐 조치안해, 2014. 5. 16. 
7. Donga-Ilbo, [세월호 참사]최초 출동 항공구조사 “선내 정보없었다” , 2014. 8. 13. 
8. Donga-Ilbo, “재난보도, 신속성보다 정확성 우선” , 2014. 9. 17. 
9. Chosun-Ilbo, [진도 여객선 침몰 / 드러나는 사고 원인] "船室(선실) 늘리면서 배 균형 
무너진 듯", 2014.4.18. 
10. Chosun-Ilbo,진도VTS와 세월호 교신 전문, 2014. 4.20. 
11. Chosun-Ilbo, [세월호 참사]"예견된 비극" 하나 둘 풀리는 '침몰의 수수께끼', 2014. 4.20. 
12. Chosun-Ilbo, [세월호 참사]과도한 '선령 제한' 연장이 화 불렀나, 2014. 4.21. 
13. Chosun-Ilbo, [세월호 참사] 급선회 전에 선체내 심각한 무슨일이, 2014. 4.21. 
14. Chosun-Ilbo, [세월호 침몰 / 급선회·전복 원인] "빙판 위 車가 중심 잃듯, 운항미숙 
세월號도 확 돌아간 듯", 2014. 4.21. 
15. Chosun-Ilbo, 船長의 '굿 시맨십(Good Seamanship)' 결여가 부른 세월호 慘事, 2014. 4.21. 
16. Chosun-Ilbo, [사설] 檢·警, '세월호 해운 비리' 뿌리 끝까지 도려내야, 2014.4.22. 
17. Chosun-Ilbo, [세월호 참사]"세월호 고박 장비 없었다"…면허도 '임대', 2014.4.23. 
18. Chosun-Ilbo, [세월호 참사 / 안전의식 제로 청해진해운] '세월號 쌍둥이배' 
오하마나號(청해진해운의 또다른 인천~제주 여객선)도 구명벌(救命筏·liferaft) 40개 모두 
작동 안해, 2014.4.26. 
19. Chosun-Ilbo, [세월호 참사 / 관계기관 책임 공방] 세월號, 화물 적재량의 3배 싣느라 
평형水(균형 잡으려 배에 채우는 물) 덜 채워 균형 잃은 듯, 2014.4.26. 
20. Chosun-Ilbo, '그것이 알고싶다' 세월호 침몰 집중 조명, "전직 항해사가 말하는 불편한 
진실", 2014.4.26. 
21. Chosun-Ilbo, [세월호 참사]국내 여객선 절반은 '개조'했다, 2014.4.28. 
22. Chosun-Ilbo,청와대, 정홍원 국무총리 사퇴 수리할 듯 ‘사고 수습 끝난 후’, 2014.4.28. 
23. Chosun-Ilbo,"대통령 下野하라" 비판 글에… 청와대홈피 마비, 2014.4.29. 
24. Chosun-Ilbo,일부 진보단체·네티즌, 대통령下野 요구·욕설까지, 2014.5.1. 
25. Chosun-Ilbo, [관료마피아]① 해피아(해양마피아), 세월호 참사의 책임자들, 2014.5.2. 
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26. Chosun-Ilbo, [구멍뚫린 대한민국]④ 멈추지 않는 대형사고…6人의 전문가가 말한다, 2014. 5.9. 
27. Chosun-Ilbo, 忘却에 저항하라, 2014. 5.10. 
28. Chosun-Ilbo, [세월호] 구명벌 정비업자 구속…"선박 안전 검사에 '정상' 판정", 2014. 5.14. 
29. Chosun-Ilbo, 진도VTS, 2인 1조 근무 규정 어겨,  2014. 7.4. 
30. Chosun-Ilbo, [세월호 참사]가족대책위 "국정원, 세월호 증개축 개입" 주장, 2014.7.25. 
31. Chosun-Ilbo,증언석에 선 海警 "선내 진입 훈련 받은 적 없어",  2014. 8.12. 
32. Chosun-Ilbo,세월호특별법 9·30 여야 합의문,  2014. 9.30. 
33. Chosun-Ilbo, 세월호 수사 결과: 무리한 증축∙과적∙운항 미숙이 세월호 침몰 직접 원인, 2014. 10.7. 
34. Chosun-Ilbo, 세월호 참사 209일 만에 실종자 수색작업 종료… "또 다른 희생 우려", 2014. 
11.11. 
35. Monthly Chosun, [월간조선] “여객선 운항관리 서로 맡지 않으려고...” 海水部 마피아의 
고백, 2014.5.20. 
 
